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More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different 
abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production 
are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents 
are blurred; either by lack of information about the actual performance of collaborators or 
because of random noise in the production process or both. These variables likely influence 
the surplus sharing negotiations following the production. By means of a laboratory 
experiment, we systematically investigate their role for the whole bargaining process from 
opening offers to (dis)agreements and find that uncertainties in surplus production and (even) 
a very coarse performance information lead to bargaining asymmetries. In addition, we find 
that bargainers’ subjective entitlements are also influenced by performance information and 
the randomness inherent in the production process. These differences in subjective 
entitlements together with the differences in entitlements between better and worse 
performers influence the whole bargaining process and significantly contribute to the 
differences in bargaining outcomes. 
JEL-Code: C79, C92, D01, D29, D63, D89, M59. 
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In the season of 1998–1999, a players’ strike lasting 191 days shook the National Basketball League
(NBA). Due to the strike the players lost in total about USD 500 million of income, the owners lost
about USD 1 Billion and the NBA lost billions of dollars because of dropped ratings. Ironically,
the strike set in at a time when the NBA was experiencing very high ratings and generating large
revenues from broadcast and advertisement agreements (Donovan 1998). One important reason for
the strike was that the players thought that “the league has had enormous growth, globally even”
and “players just want their fair share” (Donovan 1998), whereas the team owners argued that
they are already paying too much to the players.1 A major disagreement underlying this dispute
concerned the question of the relative contributions of players and team owners to the success of
the NBA. In a completely diﬀerent business area, a similar conﬂict was reported between the voice
actor of a popular computer game and the company owning the rights of the game. The involved
parties strongly disagreed on their relative contribution to the sales success of the game, and in
consequence, on the relative fair share of the gains they felt entitled to (Schiesel 2008).2
Disagreements about how to share a jointly produced surplus do not only occur in cases of
unexpected success but also, and probably more ﬁercely, in situations of economic distress. Discus-
sions and disputes about how to share the burden between white collar and blue collar workers or
between management and workers during business and economic crises come to mind (Corfman and
Shmeltzer 2002; Buhayar 2009; Lyons 2009). A recent example is the economic crisis in Greece: on
February 10, 2010, thousands of people hit the streets of Athens to protest the Greek government’s
belt-tightening program amid a deep economic crisis. Their message was that the crisis is mainly
due to the wrong-doings of the high-level managers and corrupt business practices in the ﬁnancial
sector and hence the burden should be put on them, not on the low-income, blue-collar workers.
Also in the (semi-)public sphere discussions about how to share the fruits of success and the burden
of distress are frequent. In academic institutions ﬁnancial distress leads to less liquidity and, hence,
necessary cuts in departments’ budgets. In such situations, while most agree on the necessity of
cuts, there is much disagreement about the distribution of the burden and how it is going to be
determined (Jan 2009). Another example are arising discussions and conﬂicts when it comes to
1The cited statements are taken from the speech of Atlanta Hawks forward and member of the union’s executive
committee, Tyrone Corbin.
2The computer game Grand Theft Auto IV became the fastest selling game to date when it was released on
December 2, 2008 in the United States. It sold about 3.7 million copies on its ﬁrst day, generating at least USD 500
million revenue in the ﬁrst week (Ortutay 2008; Totilo 2008). The voice actor (Michael Hollick) and the company
(Rockstar Games) haggled about the relative contributions of the “human performance” and the “conception of the
art director” to the success of the game.
1reforms of public pensions or health insurance systems, where the conﬂict often centers around the
question of the relative burden diﬀerent generations and diﬀerent income groups have to carry.
How diﬀerent these examples are, they are all related to the fact that economic surplus is the
joint product of diﬀerent people whose interests diverge when it comes to the division of the jointly
created surplus. Agreements on how to divide the surplus may seem easy if it is without doubt
determined by the contributions of all involved parties and when there is complete information
of the relative contributions. However, often, if not most of the time, the relative contributions
of the involved parties cannot be precisely determined and success and failure is at least partly
determined by random factors inherent to the production process. The (lack of) information and
the (un)certainties in the production process may lead to disagreements among the parties and,
hence, may inﬂuence the outcomes of negotiations on how to share the produced surplus. In
addition, there is evidence that such negotiations can be inﬂuenced by entitlements and obligations
parties bring to the bargaining table (Thompson and Loewenstein 1992; Babcock et al. 1996;
G¨ achter and Riedl 2005).
Interestingly, there is no clean evidence on how relative performance information and informa-
tion about the inﬂuence of exogenous factors in surplus creation aﬀects bargaining outcomes. Such
evidence is important, however, because a good understanding of the inﬂuences of these factors
on bargaining behavior may help to avoid discussions and potentially costly conﬂicts as reported
above. In addition, in the reported examples the involved parties often explicitly or implicitly refer
to their (perceived) entitlements when arguing in their own favor. For instance, in the NBA conﬂict
players claimed that they only wanted their fair share and in political discussions around pension
reforms it is often the older generation which argues that they have contributed to the increase in
wealth and are, hence, now entitled to their fair share. In view of this, it is surprising that little
is known about the interaction between information on relative contributions and uncertainties in
surplus creation and entitlements in bargaining.
In this paper we implement a 2 × 2 experimental design to investigate the eﬀects of relative
performance information and random noise in the production process on bargaining behavior, and
to explore how these factors interact with subjective entitlements.3 Speciﬁcally, in one condition the
surplus is produced by the performance of two subjects in a real eﬀort task in a deterministic way,
whereas in another condition the surplus size is also inﬂuenced by a random factor. To investigate
the eﬀect of relative performance information, in one condition we inform subjects in a bargaining
3In the literature, the term “entitlement” is not always used in the same way. In our study we use the term as
deﬁned by Schlicht (1998, p.24): “Entitlements are rights, as perceived by the individual. They are not, however, ab-
stract legal rights. Rather they denote the subjectively perceived rights that go along with a motivational disposition
to defend them.”
2pair whether (s)he has been the better or worse performer, whereas such information is not given in
another condition. In addition, in all conditions we elicit subjects’ subjective entitlements by way
of a fairness question as in G¨ achter and Riedl (2005). After production subjects have to bargain
on the distribution of the surplus in a computerized free-form bargaining environment, where we
can trace all important elements of the negotiation process from opening proposals, concession
behavior, bargaining duration, and (dis)agreements.
We ﬁnd that information about the relative performance as well as (the absence of) noise
in the surplus production aﬀect bargaining behavior at all levels. Compared to the situation
without performance information, in the condition with performance information opening proposals
and agreements are skewed away from an equal split in favor of the party that performed better
in the real eﬀort task. In addition, relative performance information leads to smaller and later
concessions and longer bargaining duration. Furthermore, in comparison to surplus production
with noise, opening proposals favor the better performing party, concessions are smaller and later,
and bargaining duration is longer, when the surplus creation is deterministic.
Subjective entitlements play an important role in explaining diﬀerences in bargaining outcomes
within as well as between conditions. First, probably unsurprisingly, entitlements of better and
worse performers diﬀer and they diﬀer most in the condition with relative performance information.
Second, and more importantly, we can trace the diﬀerential inﬂuence of entitlements among the
diﬀerent conditions through the whole bargaining process. In all conditions, opening proposals of
better performers are signiﬁcantly positively inﬂuenced by their entitlements. This does not hold for
worse performers. Concession behavior and bargaining duration are strongly related to the tension
in entitlements between better and worse performers, but only in conditions with performance
information and deterministic surplus production. In consequence, in these conditions, bargaining
durations are also inﬂuenced by entitlements. When the production process is deterministic also
agreements are strongly inﬂuenced by entitlements of the better performing subject, but not by
the worse performing subject. In summary, we ﬁnd that the knowledge of relative performances
in the real eﬀort task as well as the randomness of the production process diﬀerentially inﬂuence
bargaining behavior, and that much of this diﬀerences are mediated by subjective entitlements
bargainers derive in the production process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief overview of the
related literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures, Section 4 reports the
results and Section 5 concludes.
32 Related Literature
There are only a handful of papers, which examine the inﬂuence of fairness judgments (or subjective
entitlements) on negotiations. Messick and Sentis (1979) report results from an experiment showing
that subjects’ fairness judgments are self-servingly biased. Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) also
ﬁnd that subjects’ fairness interpretations are egocentric and that these biases cause delays in
settlement and that the magnitude of these biases predicts the length of delays in agreements.
Along the same lines, Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) show that self-servingly biased assessments
of fairness can delay agreements and cause impasse even when the fairness assessments are common
knowledge or impartial. More recently, G¨ achter and Riedl (2005) ﬁnd strong entitlement eﬀects
that shape all layers of the negotiation process and they argue that entitlements constitute a “moral
property right” that is inﬂuential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights.
Standard bargaining theory predicts that more information leads to more eﬃcient bargaining
by reducing information asymmetries between bargaining parties and, hence, strategic delays (Ru-
binstein 1985; Admati and Perry 1987). However, Camerer and Loewenstein (1993) show that
increasing the information available to bargainers may lead to less eﬃcient bargaining. The main
reason for this is that the information provided to bargainers may strengthen the tension between
their fairness judgments and this eﬀect may oﬀset the positive eﬀect information is supposed to
have.4 Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ and, Camerer (1995) and Loewenstein and Moore (2004)
are other studies, which also showed that sharing information may lead diverging perceptions of
fairness and, hence, make settlements less likely.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that examines the inﬂuence of noise in the
surplus production process on the bargaining of how to share the produced surplus. Diekmann et
al. (2004) argue that when people face increased uncertainty, fairness becomes more important to
them and fairness judgments aﬀect their reactions more strongly. However, their study investigates
the inﬂuence of uncertainty about performance standards and appropriate behaviors on the rela-
tionship between fairness and job satisfaction. Babcock, Loewenstein and Wang (1995) study the
eﬀect of uncertainty about the bargaining opponent’s reservation value and show that uncertainty
4When motivating their argument they present the following interesting example about the potentially negative
inﬂuence of information on bargaining outcomes: “For example, suppose two people contribute diﬀerent amounts of
time to a joint project. The person who worked less will typically think that equal compensation is fair, while the
person who worked more will think that payments should be proportional to eﬀort (Messick and Sentis 1983). If the
parties bargain over how to split the proceeds from the project and each know how much the other worked, they may
have diﬃculty in agreeing up on a split, since the one who worked more will demand a larger share of the proceeds
while the one who worked less will demand an equal share. If the parties did not know how much the other put in,
however, they could not base compensation on input levels and they might be more likely to settle.”
4decreases bargaining eﬃciency. A related literature concerns people’s tendency to overestimate
their own inputs (see Ross and Sicoly 1979) and that the interpretation of “deservingness” is of-
ten controversial (see Bazerman and Neale 1992). Both of these eﬀects may be intensiﬁed under
uncertainty.
3 Experimental Setup
In our experiment, randomly and anonymously paired subjects take on the role of department heads
of a company who have to bargain over a salary budget. This salary budget is either completely or
only to some extent determined by the department heads’ joint performance in a real eﬀort task.
In addition, we vary the information about the relative performance of the department heads.
Speciﬁcally, in the noinfo condition subjects receive no information on their relative or absolute
performances in the real eﬀort task, whereas in the info condition subjects get informed who in a
pair had the better and who had the worse performance. In the deterministic (det) condition the
salary budget is completely determined by department heads’ joint performance, whereas in the
stochastic (stoc) condition the salary budget is determined by department heads’ joint performance
only with a 25% chance and randomly determined with a chance of 75%. Hence, we have a 2 × 2
experimental design with four treatments, which are labeled as noinfo-stoc, noinfo-det, info-stoc
and, info-det.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are informed that their ﬁrm has a salary budget
of 2050 points available and that this budget can change depending on their performances or some
factors external to the ﬁrm. In any event, the top management of the ﬁrm does not want to impose
a salary distribution. Instead, the department heads are asked to bargain over the distribution of
the salary budget.5 In the experiment 100 points are worth 65 euro cents. Hence, the default salary
budget of 2050 points corresponds to e 13,33.
Table 1 summarizes the main elements of the experiment in the sequence they were presented
to the subjects.6 Below, we explain each part in detail.
Performance and Outcome Determination: After reading the instructions aloud, the per-
formance of each department head is determined with a general knowledge quiz (Hoﬀman et al.
1994; Clark 1998; G¨ achter and Riedl 2005). Before taking the quiz subjects are informed that their
performances will aﬀect the salary budget either for sure (in det) or with some chance (in stoc).
5This framing and some other details of the experimental design are borrowed from G¨ achter and Riedl (2005).
6After stage 7 we conducted another bargaining round, which was not pre-announced. The results of this stage
are reported elsewhere.
5Table 1: Sequence of Events
1. Reading of instructions
2. Performance determination
3. Outcome determination
4. Elicitation of beliefs on performances
5. Relative performance information†
6. Measurement of entitlements
7. Bargaining
8. De-brieﬁng questionnaire
†This information is given only in info condition
The general knowledge quiz consists of 16 multiple choice questions. For each question ﬁve
possible answers are provided, with exactly one being the correct answer. The questions concern
several ﬁelds of knowledge, such as politics, music, religion, astronomy and, geography. Each
participant receives the same set of questions in the same order. Subjects have at most 30 seconds
to answer each question. Unanswered questions count as wrong answers. The head of department
with the most correct answers in each pair has a better performance. All subjects are informed of
these details.
After the quiz, subjects get to know the actual salary budget, which could be 1390, 2050, or 2710
points. In the det condition, the salary budget is determined completely by the joint performances
of department heads in a pair and described to subjects in the following way:
(i) If the total number of correct answers by you and the other department head is from 0 to 10,
then the salary budget will be 1390 points.
(ii) If the total number of correct answers by you and the other department head is from 11 to 20,
then the salary budget will be 2050 points.
(iii) If the total number of correct answers by you and the other department head is from 21 to 32,
then the salary budget will be 2710 points.
In the stoc condition, subjects are informed that with a chance of 25%, their salary budget is
determined by their joint performances and with a chance of 75% randomly, in which case each
salary budget size has an equal chance to be chosen.
Elicitation of Beliefs on Performances: Knowing the salary budget, each subject is asked
to report his or her beliefs about the own number of correct answers as well as the number of
correct answers of the other department head. The rationale for asking subjects’ beliefs about their
6performances after informing them about the value of the salary budget is that attributions may
be reﬂected by these beliefs. These belief elicitations are incentivized: for each precise estimation,
a subject earns 60 points, for each estimation with 1 (2) error(s), a subject earns 30 (15) points;
estimates with larger errors do not earn any points.
Relative Performance Information: In the noinfo condition, subjects are not given any in-
formation about their relative performances in the quiz. In the info condition, they are given
information indicating whether they are the better or worse performer in their pair.7 Speciﬁcally,
the department head with more (less) correct answers in each pair receives a message saying that
“You had more (less) correct answers in the general knowledge quiz than the other department
head”. In case of ties, subjects are also informed about that.
Measurement of Subjective Entitlements: We measure subjective entitlements of bargainers
by an arbitrator question, adapted from Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ and, Camerer (1995).
All subjects answer the following question:8
“According to your opinion, what would be a ‘fair’ distribution of the salary budget from the
vantage point of a non-involved neutral arbitrator? (Please use exact amounts; no intervals! The
amounts have to sum up to the salary budget!)”
The answer given to this question informs us about subjective fairness judgments that are likely
to inﬂuence bargaining behavior (cf. G¨ achter and Riedl 2005).
Bargaining: Subjects in each pair have to bargain over the available salary budget. Bargaining can
take at most ten minutes and if subjects reach an agreement, they are paid their agreed shares. If
they do not reach an agreement within ten minutes, they are ‘ﬁred’ by the top management and do
not earn any points from bargaining. Bargaining is free-form because it avoids exogenous ﬁrst-mover
eﬀects and gives subjects as much bargaining freedom as possible (e.g., in the timing, sequence and
number of proposals). Subjects are seated in computer cubicles and bargain anonymously over a
computer network by sending proposals that consist of an amount for themselves and an amount
for the other department head. Verbal communication is not allowed.9
7The rationale for presenting this information after eliciting beliefs on performances is two-fold. First, the salary
budget information already reduces performance uncertainty and we did not want to present more information that
might inﬂuence subjects’ beliefs, and second, we did want to have a certain level of symmetry in belief elicitation
between the info and noinfo conditions.
8Subjects were not informed about this question beforehand. They answered it after they stated their beliefs
about performances in the noinfo condition and after they received the relative performance information in the info
condition, respectively. Hence, subjects’ fairness judgments may depend on the role (they believe) they are in. For
this reason, we call this entitlements subjective.
9For bargaining instructions and a bargaining screen-shot, see the Web Appendix on the authors’ websites.
7De-brieﬁng Questionnaire: After all parts of the experiment are ﬁnished, subjects are asked
to report their satisfaction about the bargaining outcome, their opinion about the quiz and their
bargaining behavior. They are also presented the Machiavelli personality test (Christie and Geis
1970) to measure certain personality traits such as toughness, self-orientation, competitiveness,
etc., which could be important in bargaining, and a risk attitude questionnaire (Dohmen et al.
2005). Finally, subjects answer a few questions about their personal background.
The experiment was computerized and programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We con-
ducted the experiment in the BEElab (Behavioral and Experimental Economics laboratory) of
Maastricht University in April 2009 and February 2010. In total 348 subjects participated in 16
randomized experimental sessions. Most of our subjects were undergraduates in economics, busi-
ness and international business. A typical session lasted about 90 minutes. The average earnings
per subject were approximately e 16 (including a show-up fee of e 3).
4 Results
We ﬁrst present some descriptive statistics using the pooled data from all conditions and then
move on to a more detailed analysis of important aspects of the bargaining process (that is, opening
proposals, concessions, bargaining duration, agreements). In the analysis of the diﬀerent conditions
we focus on diﬀerences between the info and the noinfo conditions (aggregating over det and stoc)
and the det and the stoc conditions (aggregating over info and noinfo). The reason for this focus
is that it allows us to examine, on the one hand, the eﬀect of performance information, and, on
the other hand, the eﬀect of uncertainty in the budget determination process. Thereafter, we
relate diﬀerences in the bargaining process across diﬀerent conditions to diﬀerential inﬂuences of
subjective entitlements.
In what follows, we refer to the subject with more (less) correct answers in the general knowledge
quiz as the “winner” (“loser”) and express all allocations in shares to the winners (“winner share”).
Throughout the paper, when referring to statistical tests, we use two-sided Mann-Whitney signed
rank, Wilcoxon rank-sum, and Spearman rank-order correlation tests where appropriate and unless
otherwise stated.
Overall, in 22 (out of 174) pairs both subjects had the same number of correct answers. On
average, the fairness judgment of these subjects is 0.53. 19 of these pairs agreed on an equal
division of the salary budget. Whenever we analyze winners’ and losers’ behavior (e.g., their
fairness judgments, opening proposals etc.) we exclude these pairs from the analyzes. Furthermore,
in regression analyzes where we use pair-level data (e.g., bargaining duration, concession behavior
8etc.) these pairs are included and their impact is controlled for with a dummy variable, tie. It takes
the value 1 for pairs where both subjects had the same number of correct answers, and 0 otherwise.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The average number of correct answers in the quiz was 7 (out of 16). On average, subjects predicted
that they had 7.26 correct answers and that the other department head had 7.54 correct answers
(p = 0.015). That we do not observe overconﬁdence is in line with ﬁndings in other studies
indicating that there is no (or negligible) overconﬁdence at success levels of around 50% (cf. Moore
and Healy 2008; Blavatskyy 2009). Importantly, subjects’ answers to the de-brieﬁng questions
about the quiz show that they perceive it as a legitimate measure of general knowledge, which is
also conﬁrmed by subjects’ opinion on the diﬃculty of the quiz.10
The salary budget of 1390, 2050, and 2710 points occurred in 55, 81, and, 38 pairs, respectively.
In the statistical analysis we pool all salary budget sizes because there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
with regard to any main behavioral aspects, as fairness judgments, bargaining duration, agreements,
etc., across diﬀerent budget sizes.11 Overall, the average duration of bargaining was 5.48 minutes
and the average number of proposals in a pair was 11.6. Out of 174 bargaining pairs, 169 reached
an agreement, with an average winner share (of the salary budget) of 0.53. We exclude the ﬁve
pairs which did not reach an agreement from our analyzes of agreement times and agreements.
4.2 The Eﬀects of Information and (Un)certainty on Bargaining Outcomes
Opening Proposals: Figure 1 depicts the distribution of the very ﬁrst proposals (opening proposals)
made in a bargaining pair, separately for losers and winners in the pooled data. As the ﬁgure
shows, winners’ opening proposals are always at or to the right of 0.50 (mean 0.63) and losers’
opening proposals are mostly at or to the left of 0.50 (mean 0.45). The equal-split (50-50) is the
modal opening proposal of losers, who made an opening proposal in 26 out of 73 cases.
The share proposed in the very ﬁrst oﬀer clearly depends on the role the subject is in. In all
four conditions, the opening proposals of winners are highly signiﬁcantly larger than the opening
proposals of losers (p < 0.0001). In addition, 11 (1) of 12 equal-split proposals in info came
10In a 7-point Likert scale where “1 = do not agree at all” and “7 = agree very much”, the average (median) degree
of agreement with the statement “In my view the knowledge questions have been diﬃcult” is 5.10 (5). On the same
scale, the average (median) degree of agreement with the statement “The one with the better general knowledge is
able to answer more questions correctly” is 5.42 (6).
11Across all three salary budgets, Kruskal-Wallis rank tests fail to reject the null hypotheses of equality of fairness
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Figure 1: Distribution of Openining Proposals (pooled data)
from losers (winners) and 14 (3) of 17 equal-split opening proposals made in noinfo came from
belief-losers (belief-winners).12
Table 2 shows the average opening proposals (in winner shares) by winners and losers in the
diﬀerent conditions and treatments. The results depicted in the table show that both the presence
of relative performance information and the way the salary budget is determined cause diﬀerences
in opening proposals. For winners and losers they are higher in the info condition than in the
noinfo condition (p = 0.0001 for winners and p = 0.006 for losers), and they are also higher in the
det condition than in the stoc condition (winners: p = 0.1040, losers: p = 0.003). This indicates
that whenever there is performance information or outcome certainty, winners’ opening proposals
become more aggressive and losers’ opening proposals become more accommodating.
Concessions: We employ three concession indices introduced by G¨ achter and Riedl (2005), which
incorporate both the size of a concession and the time at which a concession is made. These three
measures are (i) the sum of average relative concessions, (ii) the sum of average concession times,
and (iii) the sum of average time-weighted relative concessions, where the sum is taken over the
individual statistics of the two bargainers in a pair.13 These indices combine individual-level data
12Belief-winners (belief-losers) are subjects whose predictions of number of own correct answers are greater (less)
than their predictions of other department head’s number of correct answers.
13The exact deﬁnitions are as follows (adapted from G¨ achter and Riedl 2005): A relative concession of a winner is
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between a winner’s standing oﬀer (in winner share) and his new oﬀer (in winner share) divided
by the current bargaining area. The current bargaining area is given by the diﬀerence between the standing oﬀer of
the winner (as winner share) and the standing oﬀer of the loser (as winner share). A relative concession of a loser
is deﬁned analogously. For example, if the standing oﬀers of a winner and a loser are 0.7 and 0.5, respectively (i.e.,
the current bargaining area is 0.2), and the winner now demands only 0.6 for himself, then the absolute concession











































Note: Numbers in parentheses are the numbers of observations.
in each pair and summarize the concession behavior in a pair, which circumvents the problem of
reciprocal behavior in bargaining when analyzing individual concession behavior (Kuon and Uhlich
1993; Hennig-Schmidt 1999).
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for all three concession indices in all four conditions. Note,
that a larger value of the sum of average relative concessions (relative-concession) indicates larger
concessions, a larger value of the sum of average concession times (concession-time) indicates later
concessions and, a larger value of the sum of average time-weighted relative concessions (time-
weighted) indicates earlier and/or larger concessions.
The ﬁgures in the table show that, concessions in the noinfo condition are larger (relative-
concession = 1.06) and earlier (concession-time = 258.9) compared to those in the info condition
(0.75 and 420.0, respectively). The average time-weighted relative concessions are also larger in
the noinfo condition (time-weighted = 512.3) than in the info condition (284.6). All diﬀerences are
statistically highly signiﬁcant (p ≤ 0.0001). Qualitatively, the same relationships hold for all three
is 0.1 and the relative concession is 0.5 (= 0.1/0.2). The magnitude of 0.5 can be interpreted as going halfway
toward an agreement. The initial bargaining area is assumed to be equal to the salary budget (i.e., 1). A concession
leading to a new oﬀer that precisely matches the opponent’s standing oﬀer gives a relative concession of 1. Therefore,
an acceptance is calculated as a relative concession of 1. The summary statistics average relative concession of a
bargainer is just the average of all of his relative concessions made during the bargaining process.
The average concession time of a bargainer is deﬁned as the sum of concession times divided by the number of
concessions.
A time-weighted relative concession is a relative concession (as deﬁned above) multiplied by (600 −
time of concession) if the concession is positive and multiplied by time of concession if the concession is negative,
respectively. This measure has the property that a given positive (negative) relative concession gets the less (more)
weight the later the concession is made. The statistic we use is the average of all time-weighted relative concessions
of a bargainer.
11Table 3: Average Concession Behavior in each Condition




























Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
concession indices when comparing the stoc condition with the det condition. Here, the diﬀerences
in concession-time and time-weighted concessions are also statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.0483 and
p = 0.0671, respectively).
Bargaining Duration: The mean bargaining duration is 329 seconds, which is slightly more than
half of the 600 seconds of bargaining time given to the subjects. Agreement times are widely
dispersed (standard deviation: 232 seconds) and range from agreements already after 12 seconds
to last-second agreements. Table 4 reports the distribution of agreements over time (in minute
blocks). The statistics shown in table indicate that agreements are reached most frequently either
at the very beginning or at the very end. 49 pairs (out of 169 pairs that reached agreements) agreed
in the ﬁrst two minutes. In the next seven minutes, only 57 pairs reached agreements, whereas
the number of pairs that stroke an agreement in the last minute is 63. 54 of these 63 last-minute
agreements are reached in the last ﬁve seconds. This tendency to reach agreements in the last
minute is in line with observations in many other free-form bargaining experiments (see, e.g., Roth
et al. 1988).
Importantly, the frequency of last-minute agreements strongly varies across conditions. In the
Table 4: Distribution of Agreements over Time
time blocks 0 − 1 1 − 2 2 − 3 3 − 4 4 − 5 5 − 6 6 − 7 7 − 8 8 − 9 9 − 10
Pooled Data 28 21 15 9 14 8 3 4 4 63
noinfo 20 16 12 6 6 4 0 1 2 22
info 8 5 3 3 8 4 3 3 2 41
stoc 14 13 9 7 7 5 3 3 2 27
det 14 8 6 2 7 3 0 1 2 36
12info condition they are almost twice as frequent as in the noinfo condition (41 vs. 22) and in the
det condition they are more frequent than in the stoc condition (36 vs. 27). Tests of equality of
proportions conﬁrm that theses diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.0002 and p = 0.0184,
one-sided tests). The diﬀerences across conditions are also reﬂected in average bargaining durations.
The average bargaining duration in the noinfo condition is 255 seconds whereas it takes subjects 424
seconds to strike an agreement in the info condition (p < 0.0001). Similarly, in the stoc condition,
on average, an agreement is reached after 307 seconds but this takes, on average, 369 seconds in
the det condition (p = 0.09). Hence, bargaining was tougher in info and det than in noinfo and
stoc.
Agreements: Figure 2 depicts the distribution of agreements (in winner shares) across all conditions.
It shows that although about half of all agreements (82 out of 169) are equal-splits, agreements
are clearly twisted in favor of winners. On average, the agreed share to a winner is 0.53 and it
is signiﬁcantly greater than 0.50 (p < 0.0001). In 73 cases (out of 169) the agreeed share to the



















.2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8
Winner Share in Agreements
Figure 2: Disribution of Agreements (pooled data)
The pooled data conceal quite some diﬀerences in agreements across conditions, however. Fig-
ure 3 depicts the distribution of agreements (in winner shares) in the info and noinfo conditions
(Panel (a)) and in the det and stoc conditions (Panel (b)), separately.
Figure 3(a) indicates a clear diﬀerence in agreements between the info and the noinfo condition.
In noinfo all agreements are close to the equal split, whereas agreements in info they are mostly
spread out between 0.5 and 0.65. Equal splits occured only 17 times in the info condition, but
65 times in the noinfo condition. A test of equality of proportions shows that this diﬀerence is
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(b) det and stoc conditions
Figure 3: Distributions of Agreements in each Condition
the info condition, but only 0.51 in the noinfo condition. This diﬀerence is statitically signiﬁcant
(p < 0.001). Furthermore, in the info condition the average agreed share is signﬁcantly larger than
0.50 (p = 0.000), whereas this is not the case in the noinfo condition (p = 0.7788).
Figure 3(b) suggests only little diﬀerences in agreements between the det and stoc conditions.
Indeed, on average, the agreed share to the winner is 0.52 in condition stoc condition and 0.53 in
condition det. These averages are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.50 in both conditions (p < 0.0001).
However, the average agreed shares do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between the two conditions (p =
0.3786).
Table 5 summarize our main ﬁndings reported in this subsection.
Table 5: Signiﬁcant Diﬀerences between Conditions
diﬀerence between
info and noinfo det and stoc




144.3 Explaining Diﬀerences in Bargaining Outcomes
We hypothesize that the inﬂuence of relative performance information and (un)certainty on bar-
gaining behavior operates – at least to some extent – through derived subjective entitlements. In
this subsection, we analyze the derived entitlements and examine the link between the diﬀerences in
bargaining outcomes across conditions reported in the previous subsection and these entitlements.
The Subjective Entitlements
Figure 4 depicts the distribution of subjective entitlements (in winner shares) for winners and























Figure 4: Distribution of Subjective Entitlements for Losers and Winners (pooled data)
losers subjective entitlements are skewed away from the equal split in favor of the winner. The
average subjective entitlement of winners is 0.57 and of losers is 0.54. This diﬀerence is statistically
signiﬁcant (p = 0.0001).
If relative performance information or certainty about the outcome lead to stronger entitlements
for winners, we should observe winners’ entitlements to be more skewed away from the equal split
in info and det conditions than in noinfo and stoc, respectively. We also expect that entitlements
are more inconsistent between winners and losers when there is information about the performance
(info) or when it is certain that performance determines the salary budget (det) than when this is
not the case.
Table 6 shows the average subjective entitlements of winners and losers in each treatment and
condition. Winners’ and losers’ entitlements indeed diﬀer systematically across conditions. In
particular, the winner share of the salary budget winners believe to be fair is signiﬁcantly higher
in the info condition (0.61) than in the noinfo condition (0.54) (p < 0.0001). In contrast, for losers
average entitlements (in winner share) are signiﬁcantly smaller in the info condition (0.53) than in
15the noinfo condition (i.e., 0.56) (p = 0.0207). On the other hand, there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in subjects’ entitlements between the stoc and the det conditions (p = 0.2831 and p = 0.9364 for
winners and losers, respectively).











































Note: Numbers of observations in parentheses.
The observed diﬀerences in subjective entitlements across conditions between winners and losers
clearly suggest a role-speciﬁc self-serving bias. As already reported above, for the pooled data, when
comparing entitlements of winners and loser we ﬁnd a small (3 percentage points) but statistically
signiﬁcant self-serving bias (p = 0.0001). For individual conditions, we observe a larger self-serving
bias in info and det. In the info condition the diﬀerence between winners’ and losers’ subjective
entitlements amounts to 7.8 percentage points (p < 0.0001), and in condition det it amounts to
4.7 percentage points (p = 0.0006). There are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in entitlements between
winners and loser in the noinfo and stoc conditions. The non-existence of a self-serving bias in
the noinfo condition is hardly surprising, because subjects had no information about their relative
performance. However, on an individual level there may be some relation between the beliefs about
ones relative performance and derived subjective entitlements. To analyze this we use the elicited
beliefs about the number of correct answers in the quiz to examine if there is a self-serving bias
present for those who believed that they were the winners or losers. In the noinfo condition, the
subjective entitlements of such belief-winners is 0.56 and that of belief-losers is 0.54. The diﬀerence
is small and not signiﬁcant (p = 0.1548).
The Role of Subjective Entitlements in the Bargaining Process and Outcome
In subsection 4.2, we have seen that with relative performance information (info) or outcome
certainty (det) bargaining was tougher and that agreements diﬀered across conditions. We now
examine if these diﬀerences in the bargaining process and outcome are mediated through subjective
entitlements. Speciﬁcally, in comparison to the noinfo and stoc conditions, we expect a stronger
16correlation in conditions info and det, between subjective entitlements and (i) opening proposals,
(ii) concessions, (iii) bargaining duration and, (iv) agreements.
Opening Proposals: Opening proposals are likely inﬂuenced not only by entitlements but also by
strategic considerations. The data are indeed consistent with this idea. In all conditions, winners’
opening proposals are higher than their entitlements, whereas losers’ opening proposals are lower
than their entitlements. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant for winners and losers in all
conditions (p ≤ 0.0111).
Table 7: Subjective Entitlements and Opening Proposals in each Condition
Winners
noinfo info stoc det
subjective entitlement 0.54 0.61 0.56 0.59
opening proposal 0.59 0.67 0.61 0.66
diﬀerence 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.07
Losers
noinfo info stoc det
0.56 0.53 0.55 0.54
0.44 0.46 0.43 0.48
−0.12 −0.07 −0.12 −0.06
Note: diﬀerence = average opening proposal− average subjective entitlement.
We also ﬁnd that the diﬀerences between opening proposals and subjective entitlements are
diﬀerent across conditions. If entitlements matter, we should see a positive relationship between
them and the opening proposals. In addition, as argued above, we expect this eﬀect to be stronger in
the info condition than in the noinfo condition, and in the det condition than in the stoc condition.
Table 8 reports robust Tobit regression results, where we regress the opening proposals on
subjective entitlements of winners and losers, separately for each condition. In line with our hy-
potheses the coeﬃcient estimates for winners’ subjective entitlement (denoted W Fair) are positive
and statistically signiﬁcant in conditions info, det and, stoc (p < 0.036). Hence, in these conditions,
winners’ opening proposals are signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀected by their subjective entitlements.
In contrast, losers’ entitlements (denoted L Fair) are not signiﬁcant in the info, noinfo, and det
conditions and signiﬁcant with the wrong sign in condition stoc (p = 0.011). Our interpretation
of these results is that fairness judgments did not inﬂuence losers behavior in a systematic way.
Subjective entitlements did also not aﬀect opening proposals of winners in the noinfo condition, in-
dicating that entitlements are only important when they can be related to the role one has according
to the performance measure.
Concession Behavior: We know that information on the relative performance of department heads
as well as certainty regarding the process of the salary budget determination lead to smaller and
later concessions (cf. Subsection 4.2), and that it also increases the diﬀerence in winners’ and losers’
17Table 8: Explaining Opening Proposals in each Condition
Dependent Variable: opening share to winner
noinfo info stoc det




































Log-L 28.8 52.64 34.8 41.2 34.9 34.3 29.1 45.0
F 2.18 0.13 8.09∗∗∗ 1.53 4.72∗∗ 7.12∗∗ 12.01∗∗∗ 3.06
N 38 40 41 33 38 42 41 31
Note: ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates 1% (5%) signiﬁcance level; robust standard errors in parentheses.
1
8subjective entitlements (cf. Subsection 4.3). We hypothesize that these diﬀerences in concession
behavior across conditions are inﬂuenced by derived entitlements. Thus, we should ﬁnd a stronger
eﬀect of entitlements in the info condition in comparison to the noinfo condition and in the det
condition in comparison to the stoc condition.
In Table 9 we report robust Tobit estimates where we regress our most encompassing concession
measure, the time-weighted concessions, on the tension in subjective entitlements between winners
and losers, denoted as Diﬀ Fair.14 The results for the other two concession measures, relative-
concession and concession-time are qualitatively the same and reported in Table A1 in Appendix A.
The regression results show a strong inﬂuence of the tension in subjective entitlements in conditions
info and det in the expected direction (p < 0.001 for both). Hence, if it is known who the
better performer was and/or if it is known that joint performance determined the salary budget
with certainty, then the further apart the subjective entitlements of winners and loser are the less
conceding a bargaining pair appears. There is no such signiﬁcant inﬂuence of subjective entitlements
in the other two conditions.
Table 9: Explaining Concessions in each Condition
Dependent Variable: time-weighted concessions




























Log-L −649.7 −602.8 −668.9 −587.4
F 0.94 6.09∗∗∗ 2.16 6.28∗∗∗
N 90 84 91 83
Note: ∗∗∗ indicates 1% signiﬁcance level; robust standard errors in parentheses.
Tie equals 1 if both department heads had the same performance, 0 otherwise.
Bargaining Duration: We observed signiﬁcant diﬀerences in average agreement times between info
and noinfo, one the one hand, and between det and stoc, on the other hand (cf. Subsection 4.2).
14Diﬀ Fair is equal to W Fair − L Fair. It is positive when there are inconsistent entitlements and negative (or
zero) when there are consistent entitlements in a pair.
19In the following, we examine whether these diﬀerences across conditions are due to a diﬀerential
inﬂuence of entitlements in the diﬀerent conditions. Similarly to concessions, we expect bargaining
duration to be correlated with the tension in subjective entitlements of winners and losers in a pair
(i.e., Diﬀ Fair). The stronger this tension, the longer bargaining should take. In addition, the
eﬀect of entitlements should be stronger in info than in noinfo and stronger in det than in stoc.
Table 10 reports robust Tobit regression results where we regress bargaining duration on the
diﬀerence in subjective entitlements, in each condition. Note ﬁrst, that if both department heads
Table 10: Explaining Bargaining Duration in each Condition
Dependent Variable: bargaining duration




























Log-L −600.1 −516.4 −603.3 −522.6
F 3.72∗∗ 21.78∗∗∗ 11.32∗∗∗ 8.28∗∗∗
N 89 80 90 79
Note: ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates 1% (5%) signiﬁcance level; robust standard errors in
parentheses. Tie equals 1 if both department heads had the same performance,
0 otherwise.
have the same performance, i.e. if there is no winner (and loser), bargaining duration is signiﬁcantly
shorter in all conditions (cf. the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of Tie). Second, and more important,
the coeﬃcients for Diﬀ Fair have the expected sign in all conditions, but are signiﬁcant only
ininfo and det (p = 0.003 and p = 0.001, respectively). Hence, as hypothesized the subjective
entitlements of winners and losers strongly inﬂuence bargaining duration in condition info and det
only, which indicates that the diﬀerence in bargaining duration between conditions is strongly due
to a diﬀerential inﬂuence of these entitlements.
As reported in Subsection 4.2, we observe a large number of last-minute agreements. In addition,
the frequency of such last-minute agreements was much larger in the info condition than in the
noinfo condition, whereas the diﬀerence between conditions det and stoc was only marginally
signiﬁcant. Hence, it is natural to ask if subjective entitlements also play a role here, or if late
20agreements are solely due to strategic considerations as reported in Roth et al. (1988) and argued
by Fershtman and Seidmann (1993). To examine this we compare the tension in entitlements (i.e.,
Diﬀ Fair) in pairs that reached agreements in the last minute with those in pairs that reached
agreements before the last minute.
In the info condition, the diﬀerence in entitlements for pairs that reached agreements in the
last minute is 9.5 percentage points whereas it is only 3.4 percentage points for pairs that reached
agreements before the last minute (p = 0.0001). In contrast, in the noinfo condition, there is no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p = 0.6339). Hence, the diﬀerence in last-minute agreements between these
two conditions is likely to be aﬀected by a diﬀerential inﬂuence of entitlements in these conditions.
In the det and stoc conditions the diﬀerences in tension in entitlements between early an late
agreeing bargaining pairs are signiﬁcant (p = 0.0007 and p = 0.003), which is consistent with the
observed small diﬀerence in frequencies of early and late agreements in these conditions.
Overall, we can conclude that relatively small tensions in subjective entitlements made a sub-
stantial impact on bargaining duration in conditions info and det.
Agreements: Finally we examine whether subjective entitlements inﬂuence agreements and if this
inﬂuence diﬀers across conditions. As reported in Subsection 4.2, we observe unequal agreements
more often in the info and det conditions than in the noinfo and stoc conditions, respectively. Hence,
we hypothesize that the eﬀect of subjective entitlements on agreements is strongest, or perhaps even
only observable, in the info and det conditions. Figure 5 plots the relationships between winners’
subjective entitlements (horizontal axes) and the agreed share to winners (vertical axes) in the


















































































(b) det and stoc conditions
Figure 5: Agreements and Subjective Entitlements
21suggests a positive relationship between subjective entitlements and agreed winner shares in info
(Spearman’s ρ = 0.38, p = 0.0005) but no such relationship in noinfo (Spearman’s ρ = −0.03,
p = 0.7741). Figure 5(b) suggests a positive relationship between subjective entitlements and
agreed shares to winners in condition det (Spearman’s ρ = 0.53, p = 0.0000) and stoc (Spearman’s
ρ = 0.39, p = 0.0001).
Table 11 reports robust Tobit regression results where we regress agreements on winners’ and
losers’ subjective entitlements, in each condition. The coeﬃcient estimates for winners’ subjective
entitlements (W Fair) are positive but statistically insigniﬁcant in conditions noinfo and info. In
contrast, it is highly signiﬁcant in conditions det (p = 0.000) and stoc (p = 0.038). The coeﬃcient
estimates for the losers’ fairness judgments (L Fair) are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in
condition det (p = 0.005). In all other cases they are insigniﬁcant. These regression results
indicate that the subjective entitlements make the strongest impact on agreements when the surplus
production is deterministic. Surprisingly, given the results on opening oﬀers, concessions, and
bargaining duration, entitlements seem not to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on agreements in the info
condition. However, when we exclude some subjects who could be interpreted as being outliers, the
Table 11: Explaining Agreements in each Condition
Dependent Variable: agreed share





































Log-L 178.5 129.2 169.4 132.3
F 1.37 26.01∗∗∗ 9.52∗∗∗ 8.00∗∗∗
N 89 80 90 79
Note: ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates 1% (5%) signiﬁcance level; robust standard
errors in parentheses. Tie equals 1 if both department heads had
the same performance, 0 otherwise.
22Table 12: Explaining Equal Splits in each Condition
Dependent Variable: equal split




























Log-pseudo-L −47.9 −21.8 −46.8 −36.0
Wald χ2 10.4∗∗ 6.83∗∗ 10.79∗∗∗ 23.67∗∗∗
N 89 71 79 79
Note: ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates 1% (5%) signiﬁcance level; robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. Tie equals 1 if both department heads had the same
performance, 0 otherwise; in info and stoc, Tie predicted the variation
in the dependent variable perfectly and is therefore dropped.
coeﬃcient estimate of W Fair in info takes on the value, 0.18 and becomes statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level (p = 0.049).15
In Subsection 4.2 we report that 82 out of 169 agreements are equal splits. This suggests an
alternative way of looking at agreements, namely asking for the determinants of equal splits. In
Table 12, we report the results of robust Probit estimates where we regress the binary variable equal-
split, which takes on the value 1 for an equal split and 0 otherwise, on W Fair, L Fair and Tie. As
expected, winners’ entitlements (W Fair) have a negative impact on the probability of observing
an equal-split. This eﬀect is most prevalent in condition det. The variable Tie is dropped in
conditions info and stoc because it predicts the variation perfectly and is statistically signiﬁcant
with the expected sign in condition det (p = 0.011).
Overall, we ﬁnd that subjective entitlements aﬀect agreements. This holds especially for the
subjective entitlements winners hold. The strength of their inﬂuence diﬀers across conditions and is
most prevalent in the condition where it is certain that the joint performance of department heads
determine the salary budget. Interestingly, and in contrast to the entitlements’ inﬂuence on opening
oﬀers, concessions, and bargaining duration, subjective entitlements have only limited inﬂuence on
15In the alternative regression ﬁve subjects (all winners) are excluded. One of them, despite being a winner,
accepted a share of less than 0.40. Another one reported a subjective entitlement of about 50% but received a share
larger than 0.75, and three others reported extreme subjective entitlements larger than 75%.
23agreements in the info condition. Nevertheless, the presented evidence strongly suggests that
diﬀerences in agreements across the diﬀerent conditions are mediated by subjective entitlements.
4.4 The role of beliefs, personality traits, risk attitudes, and gender
Subjects’ Beliefs on Performances: In the noinfo condition subjects do not receive relative perfor-
mance information, which raises the question of the importance of their beliefs on performances.
Here we report subjects’ beliefs and brieﬂy discuss their inﬂuence on subjects’ entitlements and
bargaining behavior. In condition noinfo there are 33 (48) winners (losers) who also believe that
they were winners (losers) and 18 (12) winners (losers) who believe that they were losers (winners).
Actual winners, on average, predict that they have 8.36 correct answers and that their opponents
have 8 correct answers (p = 0.0472). Actual losers, on average, predict that they have 7.10 correct
answers and that their opponents have 8.18 correct answers (p = 0.0000). These results indicate
that subjects’ predictions are pretty accurate.
If subjects’ beliefs on performances have an inﬂuence on entitlements one would expect that the
predictions for their own performance are positively correlated with these entitlements (in winner
share) for belief-winners and negatively correlated for belief-losers. We only ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
positive correlation for belief-winners (Spearman’s ρ = 0.3855, p = 0.0048), whereas for belief-
losers the correlation is negative but insigniﬁcant (Spearman’s ρ = −0.04, p = 0.690).
We also investigate whether beliefs played a role in the bargaining process. In particular, in
condition noinfo beliefs on performances may be important because in this condition subjects
receive no performance information. To investigate this we re-run the regression analyzes reported
in Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11 but replaced actual winners and losers with belief-winners and belief-losers
in the noinfo condition. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant changes in results.
In our analyses of beliefs in other conditions (i.e., info, det, and stoc) we ﬁnd that as far as
the bargaining process is concerned, subjects’ beliefs on performances have an inﬂuence only on
opening proposals and only when the surplus production is deterministic. In this condition, on
average, a belief-winner’s opening proposal is 0.62 and a belief-loser’s opening proposal is 0.57,
where the diﬀerence is marginally signiﬁcant (p = 0.0622). Concessions, bargaining duration and
agreements are not inﬂuenced by subjects’ beliefs on performances.
Personality Traits and Risk Attitudes: As mentioned in Section 3, we included post-experimental
questionnaires to obtain information about individual characteristics that may inﬂuence bargain-
ing behavior. To examine whether these characteristics indeed exert any inﬂuence on bargaining
behavior, we re-run the reported robust Tobit regression, by including Machiavelli personality test
scores, risk attitude questionnaire scores, gender, income, and age as additional explanatory vari-
24ables. We do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects of these variables in explaining opening proposals,
concessions, bargaining duration, or agreements.
Gender Pairing Eﬀects on Bargaining Outcomes: Some studies suggest gender eﬀects in bargaining
(see, e.g., Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Walters et al. 1998; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999; Ben-Ner
et al. 2004, Sutter et al. 2009). Therefore, we also examine more closely whether gender and/or
gender-pairing aﬀects bargaining outcomes. Before reporting direct eﬀects we examine other factors
that may diﬀer between genders and, hence, may exert an indirect inﬂuence on bargaining behavior.
First, we ﬁnd that subjects’ predictions about their performance in the real eﬀort task diﬀer between
male and female subjects. On average, male subjects overestimate their number of correct answers
in the quiz by 0.6 answers, while female subjects underestimate their performance by 0.06 answers.
This small diﬀerence in predictions across genders is statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.03). There
is also a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between male and female subjects’ predictions of their opponent’s
performance. Male subjects overestimate other subject’s performance by 0.82 and female subjects
overestimate other subject’s performance by 0.23. The diﬀerence between these two ﬁgures is also
signiﬁcant (p = 0.0638). Second, we ﬁnd no gender diﬀerence in subjective entitlements: male
winners’ (losers’) average fairness judgment amounts to 0.58 (0.56) and female winners’ (losers’)
average fairness judgment is 0.57 (0.54). The diﬀerence between male and female subjects is not
signiﬁcant, neither for winners (p = 0.5365) nor for losers (p = 0.4597). Finally, on average, in
bargaining agreements male and female subjects (winners and losers) receive the same shares.
Interestingly, gender diﬀerences become more pronounced when looking at gender pairings
instead of individuals’ gender.16 The average diﬀerence between winners’ and losers’ fairness
judgments in female-female pairs (0.02) and male-male pairs (0.03) do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
(p = 0.4108). However, on average the diﬀerence between ﬁrst proposals in a pair signiﬁcantly
diﬀer across female-female (0.11) and male-male (0.26) pairs (p = 0.0000). In comparison to
male-male pairs, in female-female pairs relative concessions are larger, concession times are much
earlier and, time-weighted relative concessions are much larger (male-male relative-concessions:
0.73, female-female relative-concessions: 1.12, p = 0.0151; male-male concession-time: 406.7,
female-female concession-time: 242.4, p = 0.0018; male-male time-weighted concessions: 262.4,
female-female time-weighted concessions: 551.8, p = 0.0018). Moreover, in female-female pairs,
the average bargaining duration is much shorter (235.3 seconds) than in male-male pairs (403.7
seconds) (p = 0.0009). However, the average winner’s share in agreements is almost identical in
16Note that in our experiment subjects do not know their opponent’s gender. Moreover, with 180 female and 168
male subjects, we have a very balanced sample with respect to gender. Therefore, the probability of having a male
or a female opponent is almost equal. In contrast, in Sutter et al. (2009), all subjects know the opponent’s gender.
25female-female and male-male pairs (0.525 in female-female pairs: 0.525, male-male pairs: 0.523;
p = 0.3263).
Subjects’ Behavior as They Explain It: In the post-experimental questionnaire we asked subjects
some questions about their behavior in the experiment. Most subjects gave detailed answers to
these questions. Here, we brieﬂy summarize subjects’ answers to the question, “Which factors
inﬂuenced your bargaining behavior?”. The answers can be categorized in to four major groups
emphasizing, (i) the importance of relative performance information (by far the largest group), (ii)
the (un)certainty in the surplus production process, (iii) the focalness and/or fairness of the equal-
split, and (iv) strategic concerns, such as making an unchanging sequence of proposals, inﬂuencing
opponent’s aspirations, taking strong positions, testing the opponent’s risk attitude, and waiting
until the last seconds etc. (see, e.g., Schelling 1956; Sebenius 1992). It is interesting and consis-
tent with our data on behavior that all winners mentioned the relative performance information
as an important factor inﬂuencing their behavior. In addition, almost all losers also mentioned the
relative performance information as a factor inﬂuencing their behavior. This suggests that losers
felt some obligations which were, next to the entitlements of winners, also important in the bar-
gaining process. Furthermore, in the noinfo and stoc conditions, a considerable number of subjects
mentioned the unavailability of performance information and the presence of uncertainty as factors
inﬂuencing their behavior.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we investigate how bargaining about a jointly produced surplus is aﬀected by relative
performance information and randomness in the production process. In addition, we examine how
subjective entitlements inﬂuence the bargaining process under the diﬀerent conditions regarding
relative performance information and noisy production. There is little doubt that subjects in our ex-
periment adjust their entitlements and bargaining behavior to the external conditions. Speciﬁcally,
the presence of relative performance information and the knowledge that the surplus production is
free of random factors signiﬁcantly inﬂuences almost all layers of the bargaining process as well as
derived subjective entitlements. The eﬀect of performance information is to some extent surprising
because (i) the actual information given is very coarse — subjects only learn if they are the better
or worse performer —, (ii) no explicit property right is given to better performers (as opposed to
e.g. Hoﬀman et al. 1994), (iii) no potential anchoring point is presented to the subjects (as opposed
to G¨ achter and Riedl 2005), and (iv) subjects did not believe that they performed very well in the
real eﬀort task determining the joined surplus. Uncertainty about the surplus production also has
inﬂuence on bargaining behavior. The (un)certainty in surplus production signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced
26opening proposals, concessions, bargaining duration and the likelihood of last-minute agreements.
Interestingly, despite the fact that there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between agreements (and fair-
ness judgments) across the det and stoc conditions, we ﬁnd that (un)certainty inﬂuenced agreements
through the entitlements channel.
We ﬁnd strong evidence that the diﬀerences in the bargaining process and bargaining outcomes
across conditions are mediated by a diﬀerential impact of subjective entitlements on bargaining
behavior. This shows that even economically irrelevant entitlements can inﬂuence bargaining be-
havior. The entitlements exert the strongest impact when the production process is deterministic
and when there is relative performance information. These inﬂuences are in eﬀect for opening pro-
posals, concession behavior and bargaining duration, where stronger entitlements reduce subject’s
inclination to concede and lead to later agreements. Agreements are also inﬂuenced by entitle-
ments of better performers (and sometimes by those of worse performers) in the real eﬀort task.
Especially, when the production process is deterministic these entitlements work in favor of bet-
ter performer, in the sense that (s)he receives a larger share of the surplus. In addition, in all
circumstances, stronger entitlements of better performers strongly decrease the likelihood of equal
splits. Interestingly, beliefs about their own performance do exert some inﬂuence on entitlements
and opening proposals but not to play a role in the rest of the bargaining process.
Our ﬁndings suggest an interesting and important interaction between relative performance
information, uncertainties in the surplus production process and subjective — economically irrele-
vant — entitlements. When entering negotiations agents bring their entitlements to the bargaining
table, but how these entitlements enter bargaining behavior crucially depends on the details of and
the information on the production process.
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31Appendix
A Additional Robust Tobit Regressions for Concessions
Table A1: Explaining Relative Concessions and Concession Time in each Condition
Dependent Variable: Relative Concession




























Log-L −64.1 −51.7 −62.3 −60.4
F 1.41 5.51∗∗∗ 1.24 4.04∗∗
N 90 84 91 83
Dependent Variable: Concession Time




























Log-L −610.2 −564.8 −610.0 −569.8
F 2.37∗ 6.23∗∗∗ 10.79∗∗∗ 4.57∗∗∗
N 90 84 91 83
Note: ∗∗∗ (∗∗) indicates 1% (5%) signiﬁcance level; robust standard er-
rors in parentheses. Tie equals 1 if both department heads had the same
performance, 0 otherwise.
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